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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is significant evidence and testimony of record which shows that Security 
Equipment Corporation, Inc. ("SEC") knew, or should have known, of the risk of respiratory 
injury posed by its MK-9 Fogger pepper-spray. SEC's suggestion otherwise willfully ignores the 
genuine issue of material fact that exists on this point. The trial court erred in granting SEC's 
summary judgment challenging the foreseeability of injury element of Ms. Major's claim in light 
of this evidence and testimony and the genuine issue of material fact that it creates. 1 
On three occasions, the trial court incorrectly found that Ms. Major had not met her 
burden of presenting evidence that would give rise to an issue of fact on that element. First, the 
trial court found that Dr. Yost's first affidavit did not sufficiently address the issue.2 The next 
time the issue was presented, the trial court found that Dr. Yost's second affidavit contradicted 
his deposition testimony, and struck the affidavit as a sham.3 The third time, the trial court found 
that Dr. Yost's third affidavit still failed to present a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of 
whether it was knowable at the time SEC sold MK-9 Fogger to IDOC that the product posed a 
risk of causing a respiratory injury such as that suffered by Ms. Major.4 
It was reversible error to strike Dr. Yost's second affidavit as a sham and to deny 
Ms. Major's motion for reconsideration of that order even though Dr. Yost's third affidavit 
specifically explained how his affidavit testimony was consistent with his deposition testimony. 
I R. 118-45. 
2 Tr. (7/14/11), 5-95; R. 1004-06. 
3 Tr. (9/15/11), 96-164. 
4 Tr. (1/26/12), 5-36; R. 1739-42. 
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As with these errors, the trial court further committed reversible error by granting SEC's 
motion for summary judgment and denying Ms. Major's motion to reconsider that order since 
Dr. Yost's affidavits presented a genuine issue of material fact that should have precluded 
summary judgment. As testified to by Dr. Yost, the evidence of record that shows that before 
2008 SEC knew or should have known that its aerosolized QC spray product posed the risk of 
respiratory injury like the one suffered by Ms. Major includes the following: 
In 1997' Dr. Cohen wrote in the JOURNAL OF CORRECTIONAL HEAL TH CARE5 that "studies 
of the effects of capsaicin on human physiology, anecdotal experience with field use of 
pepperspray, and controlled exposure of correctional officers in training have shown adverse 
effects on the lungs, larynx, middle airway, protective reflexes, and skin."6 
Dr. Stopford wrote in 1996 that, in analyzing the records of the North Carolina 
Department of Corrections, "symptoms requiring medical attention occurred in five percent of 
those sprayed. Of greatest concern were incidents in which officers developed shortness of 
breath, high blood pressure, chest pain, headache, and loss of consciousness. For some, 
symptoms persisted for a week or more." 7 
5 R. 410-60, I 064-1252, 1747-60, 1766-2037. 
6 R. 1779(, 11), 1793. 
7 R. 1779, 1794 (emphasis added). SEC has pointed out that the quotation was written as 
"symptoms persisted for weeks or more" and has suggested nefarious intent. Counsel assures 
this Court that there was no intent to deceive. It was a case of a typographical error. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF-2 
Several reviews as far back as 1993, as noted by Dr. Cohen, "cited animal studies 
showing that capsaicin can be mutagenic or carcinogenic, alters immune responses, and has 
substantial effects on nerves, heart, blood vessels, lungs and kidneys. "8 
Serious respiratory injury was a known risk of the use of OC and was known as far back 
as 1997 to "most likely occur in people with asthma or chronic lung disease."9 
In 2001, the U.S. Army published in the JOURNAL OF APPLIED TOXICOLOGY a review of 
riot control agents, including OC, that outlined the toxicological effects of the compound and 
stated that "Capsaicin has a spectrum of effects on sensory neurons, ranging from excitation to 
cell death, and as stated previously suprathreshold amounts of capsaicin can cause irreversible 
damage to the sensory nervous system." 10 
Prior to 2008, it was understood that "[ d]amage to the respiratory epithelium 
compromises respiratory function by increasing the susceptibility of individuals to subsequent 
lung injury and infections, and ultimately contributes to hypersensitivity disorders such as 
asthma and COPD." 11 The lung epithelium is important to respiratory function because it is the 
primary barrier to inhaled irritants and toxicants. 12 OC can "cause long term adverse health 
effects involving the respiratory system" by initiating inflammation and epithelium cell death. 13 
8 Id. at 1779-80, 1796. 
9 R. 1780. 
10 R. 1890. 
II R. 1780. 
12 R. 1780. 
13 R. 1780; see also R. 1097-1105 (Reilly & Yost study of the role TRPV 1 in respiratory 
hypersensitivity (2006)); 1106-15 (Reilly, Yost, et al., study of mechanism of TRPVI agonists 
induced cell death in respiratory epithelial cells (2005)); 1123-34 (Reilly, Yost, et al., study 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 3 
Even within the business community, it was understood in at least 2004 that capsaicin 
such as that contained in SEC's MK-9 Fogger "[m]ay cause sensitization by inhalation and skin 
contact" and that it is "[h]ighly toxic."14 It was further understood that capsaicin had been found 
to be carcinogenic and mutagenic in mice and hamsters. 15 
Since the scientific studies and literature were replete with information prior to 2008 
indicating that OC posed a threat of serious injury to the respiratory system, SEC knew or should 
have known that the MK-9 Fogger posed a serious risk of causing the kind of respiratory injuries 
Ms. Major suffers. As such, the trial court committed reversible error when it granted SEC 
summary judgment and denied Ms. Major's motion for reconsideration of that interlocutory 
order. 
This Court should therefore reverse and remand this case for trial. 
showing capsaicinoids cause inflammation and epithelial cell death by activation of TRV 
receptors (2003)); (Groneberg, et al., study showing increased expression of the TRPVI receptor 
may contribute to enhanced cough reflex and cough response (2004)); 1140-79 (Reilly, Yost, 
et al., study finding that TRPVl agonists cause endoplasmic reticulum stress and cell death in 
human lung cells (2007)); 1202-09 (Geppetti study finding TRPVl has a role in airway 
inflammation and disease (2006)); 1223-35 (Mitchell, et al., "Increase in TRPVl activity may 
have a role in the airway hypersensitivity seen in chronic cough" (2004)). 
14 R. 1780, 1785. SEC argues that the capsaicin product cited to by Dr. Yost is irrelevant 
because it is pure and the MK-9 Fogger also contains other capsaicinoids. However, SEC was 
successful in convincing the trial court that the Federal Hazardous Substance Act was the source 
of the applicable labeling requirements in this case, rather than the OSHA standards, and under 
the FHSA, manufacturers are required to provided warnings on their labels based on whether the 
product contains a hazardous substance, which includes a hazardous substance or mixture of 
substances. 16 CFR Part 1500.3(b)(4)(i). 
15 R. 1790. 
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II. ARGUMENT 
A. It Was Error For The Trial Court To Strike Dr. Yost's Second Affidavit 
And To Deny Ms. Major's Motion To Reconsider That Order16 
1. The Trial Court Should Not Have Granted SEC's Motion to Strike 
Dr. Yost's Second Affidavit. 
The trial court committed reversible error when it struck the second affidavit of Dr. Yost 
on the grounds that it purportedly contradicted his deposition testimony, and was therefore found 
to have been a sham affidavit. 
Whether the sham affidavit doctrine is applicable in Idaho is a question of law over 
which this Court exercises free review without deference to the trial court's decision. 17 
The sham affidavit doctrine, as noted by this Court in Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, has 
never been recognized in Idaho. 18 On each occasion that a party has attempted to assert the 
doctrine in order to strike an affidavit, this Court has found the doctrine inapplicable either 
because no conflict was actually presented on the record, the admissibility of the affidavit was 
irrelevant to the issues on appeal, or the affidavit failed to establish the required foundation. 19 
16 The admissibility of Dr. Yost's first and third affidavits is not at issue on appeal since the trial 
court denied SEC's motions to strike those affidavits, and SEC dismissed its cross-appeal of 
those decisions. 
17 See Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, 143 Idaho 834, 837 (2007); Arregui v. Gallegos-
Main, 2012 Ida. LEXIS 125 (May 4). 
18 Arregui, 2012 Ida. LEXIS 125. 
19 See Id; Frazier v. JR. Simplot Co., 136 Idaho 100, 103 (2001) ("not a sufficient conflict 
between Frazier's deposition testimony and her statements in her affidavit"); Kirkman v. Stoker, 
134 Idaho 541, 545 (2000) (affidavit related to non-appealable issue); Tolmie Farms, Inc. v. JR. 
Simplot Company, Inc., 124 Idaho 607, 610, 862 P.2d 299, 302 (1993) (not sufficient conflict); 
see also, Keeven v. Estate of Keeven, 126 Idaho 290, 298 (Ct. App. 1994) (Idaho Court of 
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The sham affidavit doctrine holds that an affidavit that contradicts earlier deposition 
testimony should not be considered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment.2° For the 
doctrine to apply, the affidavit must directly contradict the deposition testimony.21 The doctrine 
is problematic because it invites the trial court to invade the province of the jury by weighing the 
evidence, assessing the witness's credibility, and making factual determinations at the summary 
judgment stage.22 
If this Court adopts the doctrine, it should do so with the caveat that it only applies where 
the conflict in testimony is unequivocal and that no reasonable view of the testimony can resolve 
the conflict. The trial court's determination should be made by viewing the testimony in a light 
most favorable to the non-moving party. Without strict limitations on its application, the 
doctrine invites mischief, as it did in this case. 
Here, the trial court did not feel constrained to view the testimony in a light most 
favorable to Ms. Major because the trial court saw the issue as one of admissibility.23 A trial 
court's decisions as to admissibility of evidence are generally discretionary decisions that must 
be resolved before applying the more liberal standards applicable to motions for summary 
judgment.24 
Appeals finding vague and evasive deposition responses could not be directly contradicted by 
affidavit). 
2° Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1991 ). 
21 Id 
22 See Id. and cases cited therein. 
23 Tr. (9115111), 121-42. 
24 See Fragnella v. Petrovich, 2012 Ida. LEXIS 156 (June 21); Weeks, 143 Idaho at 837. 
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Under such circumstances, the trial court here was free to substitute its O\.Vn view of the 
scientific evidence for that of Dr. Yost's, and to draw inappropriate factual inferences from his 
testimony and evidence presented. 
Irrespective of whether this Court adopts the sham affidavit doctrine, the trial court erred 
by striking Dr. Yost's second affidavit since there was no conflict with his deposition 
testimony.25 Accordingly, this Court need not decide whether Idaho should adopt the sham 
affidavit doctrine. Instead, it can find, as it has repeatedly in prior cases, that the doctrine is 
inapplicable due to the absence of a conflict in testimony. Doing so would then require reversal 
of the trial court's decision to strike Dr. Yost's second affidavit. 
2. The Trial Court Should Have Granted Ms. Major's Motion to Reconsider Its 
Order Striking Dr. Yost's Second Affidavit as a Sham. 
The trial court committed reversible error by denying Ms. Major's motion to reconsider 
its earlier order striking Dr. Yost's second affidavit. Ms. Major had filed a third affidavit of 
Dr. Yost in support of her motion for reconsideration that explained any perceived conflicts in 
his testimony.26 Because a trial court is required to apply the same standards to a motion for 
reconsideration as apply to the original motion but in light of any new evidence submitted,27 it 
was incumbent upon the trial court to review Dr. Yost's second affidavit in light of his third 
affidavit. 
25 See Appellant's Brief, pp. 26-38 (discussing in detail why Dr. Yost's second affidavit did not 
conflict with his deposition testimony). 
26 R. 1747-65. 
27 Fragnella, 2012 Ida. LEXIS 156, 27-29; Arregui, 2012 Ida. LEXIS 125. 
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"On a motion for reconsideration, the court must consider any new admissible evidence 
or authority bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory order."28 
Since Dr. Yost's third affidavit explained why his second affidavit was not in conflict 
with his deposition testimony (which it was not),29 the trial court erred as a matter of law when it 
denied Ms. Major's motion to reconsider its order striking Dr. Yost's second affidavit. This 
Court should therefore reverse and remand this case for trial. 
B. The Trial Court Erred By Granting SEC's Motion For Summary Judgment 
And Denying Ms. Major's Motion To Reconsider That Order 
The trial court erred when it granted SEC summary judgment on Ms. Major's product 
liability claims on grounds that Dr. Yost's affidavits did not create a triable issue of fact as to 
whether it was knowable at the time SEC sold the MK-9 Fogger to IDOC that the product posed 
a risk of respiratory injury such as that suffered by Ms. Major. 
Summary judgment is only available to a defendant when it is demonstrated that no 
genuine issue of material fact exists as to one or more key elements the plaintiffs case, and 
the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.30 In making that determination, all 
evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, including all reasonable 
inference that may be drawn from the evidence.31 
28 Fragnella, 2012 Ida. LEXIS 156. 
29 On page 35 of its Response Brief, SEC represents that Dr. Yost "declared that no one in 2008 
could foresee a risk of chronic respiratory injury as a result of exposure to OC Spray." However, 
Dr. Yost never made such a declaration. 
30 Weeks, 143 Idaho at 836-837. 
31 Weeks, 143 Idaho at 836. 
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This Court reviews grants of summary judgment de novo with no deference to the trial 
court's determination.32 This Court similarly exercises de novo review of denials of motions to 
reconsider interlocutory orders granting summary judgment. 33 
In the case at hand, summary judgment was inappropriate because Dr. Yost was qualified 
as an expert to testify that, based on the state of the science as it existed prior to 2008 when SEC 
sold IDOC MK-9 Fogger, it was known that a product such as the MK-9 Fogger posed a risk of 
causing the type of injury suffered by Ms. Major. 
The trial court has discretion to decide the admissibility of expert 
testimony, and on appeal this decision will not be overturned 
absent an abuse of that discretion. Expert witness testimony is 
admissible when the expert is qualified as an expert and the 
testimony will assist the trier of fact by aiding the understanding of 
evidence or determining a fact that is at issue. "The question under 
the evidence rule is simply whether the expert's knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact; not whether the information upon which 
the expert's opinion is based is commonly agreed upon."34 
l. Dr. Yost Was Qualified to Testify That at the Time SEC Sold MK-9 Fogger to 
IDOC It Was Known That Such a Product Posed a Risk of Respiratory Injury. 
Dr. Yost was qualified as an expert in the area of toxicology and pharmacology of 
capsaicinoids on respiratory tissues and to testify as to the state of scientific knowledge on that 
subject prior to 2008 when SEC sold its MK-9 Fogger product to IDOC. 
The test for determining whether a witness is qualified as an expert 
is "not rigid" and can be found in Idaho Rule of Evidence 702. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 states: 
32 Stonebrook Constr., LLC v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 277 P.3d 374, 376 (Idaho 2012). 
33 Fragnella, 2012 Ida. LEXIS 156, 27-29; Arregui, 2012 Ida. LEXIS 125. 
34 Clair v. Clair, 2012 Ida. LEXIS 174 (July 6) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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If scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
A qualified expert is one who possesses "knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education." Formal training is not 
necessary, but practical experience or special knowledge must be 
shown to bring a witness within the category of an expert. . . . The 
proponent of the testimony must lay foundational evidence 
showing that the individual is qualified as an expert on the topic of 
his or her testimony.35 
Here, Dr. Yost was qualified as an expert to testify on the subject of the state of scientific 
knowledge prior to 2008 as it related to knm:vn risks associated with respiratory OC exposure. 36 
His education, training, and research were sufficient to meet the requirements of I.RE. 702 for 
qualification as an expert witness. 
2. Dr. Yost's Testimony Regarding the State of Knowledge at the Time 
SEC Sold MK-9 Fogger to IDOC Was Admissible Under I.R.E. 702. 
The state-of-knowledge testimony offered by Dr. Yost was admissible to show that SEC 
knew or should have known that its MK-9 Fogger posed a risk of causing the type of respiratory 
injury suffered by Ms. Major. 
Dr. Yost's scientific, technical, and other specialized knowledge offered in his affidavits 
is the kind that would assist the trier of fact in determining whether there was sufficient 
knowledge prior to 2008 that respiratory exposure to an OC product such as MK-9 Fogger posed 
35 Weeks, 143 Idaho at 837. 
36 R. 410-60, 1064-1252, 1747-60. 
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a risk of causing the kinds of injury suffered by Ms. Major. Dr. Yost identified the method used 
to reach his conclusions and some of the publications upon which he relied.37 He testified that he 
was relying on an entire body of scientific literature in reaching his conclusions.38 He explained 
the scientific principles he was applying in reaching his conclusions.39 He discussed the 
toxicology behind an injury such as Ms. Major's and the mechanisms by which it would arise 
from exposure to a product such as the MK-9 Fogger.40 And, he explained that the state of 
knowledge within the scientific community as it existed prior to 2008 included knowledge that 
exposure to an OC product such as the MK-9 Fogger posed a risk of respiratory injury to persons 
such as Ms. Major who suffer from a pre-existing respiratory illness.41 As such, it met the 
requirements set forth in I.R.E. 702 for admitting expert testimony.42 
3. Dr. Yost's Testimony Presented a Genuine Issue of Material Fact on the 
State-of-Knowledge Issue That Precluded Summary Judgment. 
Dr. Yost's affidavits and deposition testimony presented a genuine issue of material fact 
sufficient to preclude summary judgment. The trial court's ruling otherwise was reversible error. 
The issue in this case is whether SEC knew or should have known when it distributed its 
MK-9 Fogger that such a finely aerosolized OC spray, designed specifically to irritate and 
inflame the pulmonary system, posed a significant risk of respiratory injury that required a 
warning on the product label. 
37 R. 410-60, 1064-1252, 1747-60, 1766-2037. 
38 R. 410-60, 1064-1252, 1747-60, 1766-2037. 
39 R. 410-60, 1064-1252, 1747-60, 1766-2037. 
40 R. 410-60, 1064-1252, 1747-60, 1766-2037. 
41 R. 410-60, 1064-1252, 1747-60, 1766-2037. 
42 See Weeks, 143 Idaho at 837-38. 
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The issue is not whether there existed at the time of distribution a study that definitively 
showed that OC exposure causes chronic respiratory injury. This Court explained in Weeks v. 
Eastern Idaho Health Services that: 
Expert opinion which is speculative, conclusory or unsubstantiated 
by facts in the record is of no assistance to the jury in rendering its 
verdict and, therefore, is inadmissible as evidence. The Court has 
not adopted the Daubert standard for admissibility of an expert's 
testimony but has used some of Daubert' s standards in assessing 
whether the basis of an expert's opinion is scientifically valid. The 
Daubert standards of whether the theory can be tested and whether 
it has been subjected to peer-review and publication have been 
applied, but the Court has not adopted the standard that a theory 
must be commonly agreed upon or generally accepted. 
Thus "[t]he question under the evidence rule is simply whether the 
expert's knowledge will assist the trier of fact; not whether the 
information upon which the expert's opinion is based is commonly 
agreed upon." The Court stated that a scientific study does not 
have to be universally accepted in order for experts to validly use 
the study as a basis of opinion. The focus of the court's inquiry is 
on the "principles and methodology" used not the conclusions they 
generate. When an "expert's opinion is based upon scientific 
knowledge, there must likewise be a scientific basis for that 
opinion" because if the reasoning or methodology underlying the 
opinion is not scientifically sound, then the opinions would not 
assist a trier of fact. 43 
This Court went on to find that a medical expert's testimony was admissible under I.R.E. 702 in 
a medical malpractice action involving a medication error, even though the expert was unable to 
determine the exact effect of the medication used on victim's brain.44 
In this case Dr. Smith testified that the infusion was a substantial 
factor in causing Evelyn's death to a reasonable medical 
43 143 Idaho at 838 (internal citations omitted). 
44 d Ii . at 839. 
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probability, but he was unable to determine the exact effect of the 
medication on Evelyn 's brain. He testified that the mechanical 
aspect of fluid buildup could not be separated from the chemical 
aspect of the composition of the fluid, and he was not certain 
whether the chemicals themselves, the volume of fluid, or the 
combination of the two caused her death. Dr. Smith stated that it 
was impossible to tell the exact hydrodynamic, autoimmune, and 
biochemical effects of the infusion because that would require a 
series of controlled experiments or laboratory studies which would 
never be performed. No research has been done based upon this 
exact type of occurrence, and the effects of administering 
dopamine and amiodarone directly into the central nervous 
systems of humans or animals have never been studied. However, 
Dr. Smith was clear that infusion of this volume of fluid, whether 
over an eight hour period or a period of a few minutes, would 
cause a deleterious effect "just from the fact of fluid going in when 
it should be going out." This is not speculation and is based on 
more than a temporal concurrence. 
Dr. Smith based his opinion upon his experience and research. He 
provided many articles as a basis for his opinion, including: 
Monitoring and interpretation of intracranial pressure; Not again! 
(about a patient dying from an erroneous intrathecal injection of 
vincristine intended for intravenous use); and Ventricular size and 
isotope cisternography in patients with acute transient rises of 
intracranial pressure. While there is no exact known effect of the 
combination of chemicals infused into Evelyn's brain, there is 
scientifically reliable evidence regarding the effect of increased 
intracranial pressure. Dr. Smith based a portion of his opinion, 
dealing with the mechanical effect of the increased amount of fluid 
in Evelyn's brain, upon such scientifically reliable information. 
However, he testified that these effects could not be separated from 
the effects of the medications, for which there is no peer-reviewed, 
published information.45 
45 Week<i, 143 Idaho at 839 (emphasis added). 
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This Court went on to agree with the Ninth Circuit that in "instances of 'a rare 
occurrence' where there are few opportunities for scholarly research, the lack of published 
studies should not bar otherwise scientifically valid testimony."46 
In Coombs v. Curnow, this Court was more pointed in holding that scientific studies of 
the exact situation at hand is not required: 
In determining whether expert testimony is admissible, a court 
must evaluate "the expert's ability to explain pertinent scientific 
principles and to apply those principles to the formulation of his or 
her opinion." Admissibility, therefore, depends on the validity of 
the expert's reasoning and methodology, rather than his or her 
ultimate conclusion. So long as the principles and methodology 
behind a theory are valid and reliable, the theory need not be 
commonly agreed upon or generally accepted. \V'bile the court 
must "distinguish scientifically sound reasoning from that of the 
self-validating expert, who uses scientific terminology to present 
unsubstantiated personal beliefs," it may not "substitute its 
judgment for that of the relevant scientific community."47 
Here, Dr. Yost explained the pertinent scientific principles and applied them to formulate 
his opinion.48 He explained his reasoning.49 He provided citations to and copies of some of the 
studies and literature that support his opinion. 50 
He candidly admitted that he was not aware of any definitive study showing that 
exposure to OC spray would cause chronic respiratory illness. 51 The ethical restraints for doing 
46 Id. at 839 (citing Clausen v. MIV New Carissa, 339 F.3d 1049, 1060 (2003)). 
47 148 Idaho 129, 140-141 (2009). 
48 R. 410-60, 1064-1252, 1747-60, 1766-2037. 
49 R. 410-60, 1064-1252, 1747-60, 1766-2037. 
50 R. 410-60, 1064-1252, 1747-60, 1766-2037. 
51 R. 410-60, 1064-1252, 1747-60, 1766-2037. 
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such research are obvious. However, the absence of such definitive research does not detract 
from the fact that Dr. Yost's opinion was scientifically sound in principle and methodology. 
Dr. Yost was also candid in admitting that as a general rule, the effects of OC are 
transitory. 52 However, the issue in this case is not whether as a general rule the effects of OC 
exposure were understood to be transitory. Generally, most people are not exposed to OC on a 
daily basis, or exposed to highly aerosolized OC from a product like the MK-9 Fogger that 
bombards the respiratory system. 
On the other hand, correctional officers assigned to work with the most dangerous 
prisoners would foreseeably be the exception to the general rule since OC products would 
naturally be used indoors and, depending on the facility, chronic exposure could foreseeably be 
quite common where correctional officers are exposed to OC products during training and 
incident to OC spray deployment during their shifts. 
Similarly, and depending on the facility, where MK-9 Fogger is used within a prison, 
overexposure to OC would be a foreseeable event since the product is designed specifically to 
penetrate the pulmonary system. It was entirely foreseeable that someone in Ms. Major's 
circumstance would experience chronic exposure and was at risk of experiencing overexposure. 
Respiratory illness of one form or another is not uncommon, and OC exposure for that 
population poses a risk of aggravating a pre-existing respiratory illness. As a correctional officer 
working within a maximum-security prison facility where OC products were regularly used, and 
52 R. 410-60, 1064-1252, 1747-60, 1766-2037. 
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as a person who suffered from a respiratory illness, Ms. Major was at particular risk of being 
injured by the MK-9 Fogger. 
The mechanism by which MK-9 Fogger could cause a respiratory injury to persons with 
pre-existing respiratory illness was understood prior to 2008.53 It was well-documented that 
chronic exposure and/or overexposure to OC could lead to either hypersensitivity or 
hyposensitivity to other respiratory irritants commonly confronted in everyday life.54 It was 
known that hypersensitivity is caused by the up-regulation or an increase in the population of 
TRPV receptors within the respiratory tissues. 55 
The role TRPV receptors play in respiratory illness, such as chronic cough, was 
sufficiently understood prior to 2008 that SEC knew or should have known that persons with 
respiratory illness who were chronically exposed and/or overexposed to its MK-9 Fogger, such 
as persons employed as prison guards, were at risk for further respiratory injury. 56 And yet, SEC 
marketed its product to correctional facilities without any warning that the MK-9 F ogger 
presented a risk of any respiratory injury to persons with existing respiratory illness. 
The risks of respiratory injury from OC exposure were known long before 2008. 57 In 
1997, Dr. Cohen wrote in the JOURNAL OF CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE that "studies of the 
effects of capsaicin on human physiology, anecdotal experience with field use of pepperspray, 
53 R. 410-60, 1064-1252, 1747-60, 1766-2037. 
54 R. 410-60, 1064-1252, 1747-60, 1766-2037. 
55 R. 410-60, 1064-1252, 1747-60, 1766-2037. 
56 R. 410-60, 1064-1252, 1747-60, 1766-2037. 
57 R. 410-60, 1064-1252, 1747-60, 1766-2037. 
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and controlled exposure of correctional officers in training have shown adverse effects on the 
lungs, larynx, middle airway, protective reflexes, and skin."58 
Dr. Stopford wrote in 1996 that in analyzing the records of the North Carolina 
Department of Corrections, "symptoms requiring medical attention occurred in five percent of 
those sprayed. Of greatest concern were incidents in which officers developed shortness of 
breath, high blood pressure, chest pain, headache, and loss of consciousness. For some, 
symptoms persisted for a week or more. "59 
Several reviews as far back as 1993, as noted by Dr. Cohen, "cited animal studies 
showing that capsaicin can be mutagenic or carcinogenic, alters immune responses, and has 
substantial effects on nerves, heart, blood vessels, lungs and kidneys."60 
Serious respiratory injury was a known risk of the use of OC and was known as far back 
as 1997 to "most likely occur in people with asthma or chronic lung disease."61 
In 2001, the U.S. Army published in the OF TOXICOLOGY a review of 
riot control agents, including OC, that outlined the toxicological effects of the compound and 
stated that "Capsaicin has a spectrum of effects on sensory neurons, ranging from excitation to 
cell death, and as stated previously suprathreshold amounts of capsaicin can cause irreversible 
damage to the sensory nervous system."62 
-s 
'.) R. 1779 (i! 11), 1793. 
59 R. 1779, 1794 (emphasis added). 
60 R. 1779-80, 1796. 
61 R. 1780. 
62 R. 1890. 
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Prior to 2008, it was understood that "[ d]amage to the respiratory epithelium 
compromises respiratory function by increasing the susceptibility of individuals to subsequent 
lung injury and infections, and ultimately contributes to hypersensitivity disorders such as 
asthma and COPD."63 The lung epithelium is important to respiratory function because it is the 
primary barrier to inhaled irritants and toxicants. 64 OC can "cause long term adverse health 
effects involving the respiratory system" by initiating inflammation and epithelium cell death. 65 
Even within the business community, it was understood in at least 2004 that capsaicin 
such as that contained in SEC's MK-9 Fogger "[m]ay cause sensitization by inhalation and skin 
contact" and that it is "[h]ighly toxic."66 It was further understood that capsaicin had been found 
to be carcinogenic and mutagenic in mice and hamsters.67 
63 R. 1780. 
64 R. 1780. 
65 R. 1 780; see R. 1097-1105 (Reilly & study of the role TRPV 1 in respiratory 
hypersensitivity (2006)); 1106-15 (Reilly, Yost, et al., study of mechanism of TRPVl agonists 
induced cell death in respiratory epithelial cells (2005)); 1123-34 (Reilly, Yost, et al., study 
showing capsaicinoids cause inflammation and epithelial cell death by activation of TRV 
receptors (2003)); (Groneberg, et al., study showing increased expression of the TRPVI receptor 
may contribute to enhanced cough reflex and cough response (2004)); 1140-79 (Reilly, Yost, 
et al., study finding that TRPVl agonists cause endoplasmic reticulum stress and cell death in 
human lung cells (2007)); 1202-09 (Geppetti study finding TRPVl has a role in airway 
inflammation and disease (2006)); 1223-35 (Mitchell, et al., "Increase in TRPVl activity may 
have a role in the airway hypersensitivity seen in chronic cough" (2004)). 
66 R. 1780, 1785. SEC argues that the capsaicin product cited to by Dr. Yost is irrelevant 
because it is pure and the MK-9 Fogger also contains other capsaicinoids. However, SEC was 
successful in convincing the trial court that the Federal Hazardous Substance Act was the source 
of the applicable labeling requirements in this case, rather than the OSHA standards, and under 
the FHSA, manufacturers are required to provided warnings on their labels based on whether the 
product contains a hazardous substance, which includes a hazardous substance or mixture of 
substances. 16 CFR Part 1500.3(b)(4)(i). 
67 R. 1790. 
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Since Dr. Yost's affidavit state-of-the-knowledge testimony was admissible and created a 
genuine issue of material fact, it was error for the trial court to grant SEC summary judgment and 
to deny Ms. Major's motion to reconsider the trial court's grant of summary judgment. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse and remand this case for trial. 
C. Sidwell v. William Prym Is Not Controlling On The Issue Of Foreseeability 
Of Injury To The Respiratory System From Bombarding The Lungs Of A 
Person Already Suffering A Respiratory Illness With Highly Aerosolized OC 
SEC argues that Sidwell v. William Prym, Inc.,68 is on all fours with this case on the issue 
of whether the injuries involved here were foreseeable dangers of the product. However, there is 
a key identifiable distinction between this case and Sidwell. In Sidwell, this Court held that it 
was not foreseeable that a sewing pin would be thrust into the body with such force as to shatter 
against a bone.69 This Court explained that the foreseeable injuries of a sewing pin are the 
obvious pricking or sticking of the skin which are so obvious to the nature of pins in general as 
to relieve the manufacturer of the duty to warn. 70 
Here, by comparison, given the design of the MK-9 Fogger is intended to deliver highly 
aerosolized OC to the respiratory system, as compared to sprays and foams which deliver less 
OC to the respiratory system, and given the nature of OC as a toxic, mutagenic, and irritating 
substance, it was foreseeable that long-term respiratory injury could result. A rational person 
cannot doubt that a serious respiratory injury would be the likely result of fine particulates of OC 
68 112 Idaho 76 (1986). 
69 Id. at 78-9. 
10 Id. 
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spray flooding the lungs of a person who was already suffering a respiratory illness. Yet SEC 
argues to this Court that no one could have foreseen such a risk. 
Interestingly, SEC also argues that because the more common transitory effects of OC 
spray71 are obvious to all since the product was produced for the purpose of causing those 
transitory effects, it had no duty to warn of acute injury. 
In making that argument, SEC sidesteps the fact that it repeatedly represented its OC 
products as being safe under all circumstances, when it knew that persons suffering from 
respiratory illness were vulnerable to greater effects and aggravation of their existing illness 
from exposure to its product. 72 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should hold that the trial court committed reversible 
error when it struck Dr. Yost's second affidavit and denied Ms. Major's motion to reconsider 
that order. 
It should further hold that the trial court committed reversible error when it granted SEC 
summary judgment on the knowledge element of Ms. Major's claim, and denied Ms. Major's 
motion to reconsider that order. 
This case should be reversed and remanded for trial. 
71 In its Response Brief, SEC has completely avoided the obvious distinction between OC spray 
and OC fog products. 
72 See R. 384-409 (Conf. Ex., Overson Aff., if 10, Ex. 8 (Nance Dep., 21 :24 - 43:11, 44:12-17, 
50:10 - 59:17, 63:6-22, 64:3 - 65:4, 130:7 - 137:25, 139:10 - 140:12, 157:14 - 163:5 and Exs. 
B, L-0)) for evidence that SEC knew that certain OC exposures posed a risk of causing long-
term damage and aggravation of existing respiratory illness. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 20 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of August, 2012. 
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